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reliability 6 and partiality 8 7 This particular problem could be met
by the establishment of a uniform standard for experts. Set qualifica-
tions exist for admission to practice as a doctor or as a specialist, so
why not provide a test to determine the necessary qualifications of
psychiatrists for purposes of testimony in cases involving insanity?
This precaution coupled with the great weight the jury is likely to
give the findings of the state mental department, should offer a logical
solution to the expert problem. Thus the qualified psychiatrists, no
longer shackled by the archaic McNaughton test, could be of great
aid to the courts m reaching just results where msanity is a defense m
criminal cases.
To complete the picture, it is proposed that the judge may consult
with the experts of the state mental department concerning the passing
of sentence following the verdict of the jury 8
ROBERT HALL SmiTH
IMPLIED EASEMENTS OF NECESSITY CONTRASTED
WITH THOSE BASED ON QUASI-EASEMENTS
Easements may be classified according to their method of creation
as prescriptive, express and implied. Implied easements include the
easement of necessity and the easement implied from a quasi-ease-
ment. These two types are similar and for either to arise, the title
to the land must have been in a common owner and he must have con-
veyed a part of the land by deed in such a way as to create a need
for an easement to benefit the land conveyed or the land retained.
Also, both types are based fundamentally on implied intention as
determined from a construction of the deed. In spite of their similar-
ity, however, implied easements of necessity and implied easements
based on quasi-easements are clearly distinguishable, both as to the
nature of the implication underlying each and as to the circumstance
surrounding the execution of the deed which supports the implication.
This essential distinction is of considerable practical importance in
Ibzd.
White, INSAmTY AND TnE CnnNutNA LAw 56-57 (1923).
s Such a provision would be constitutional under Williams v. New York 337
U. S. 241, 246 (1949). "But both before and since the American colomes became
a nation, courts in tlis country and in England practiced a policy under which
a sentencingjudge could exercise a wide discretion m the sources and types of
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of pumshment to
be unposed within limits fixed by the law."
NOTES AND CO-mmENTS
determining whether an implied easement will arise but it is not
always recognized by the courts. It is the purpose of this note to
compare the two types of implied easements m such a manner as to
emphasize the advantage of carefully distinguishing between them,
with particular regard for Kentucky cases. It should be recognized
that easements of various kinds may be created by implication, but
because a great majority of the cases involve easements of way, for
purposes of discussion this note is limited in scope, for the most part,
to this particular type of easement.
An easement of necessity usually arises where there is a landlocked
situation which occurs when the grantor conveys land in such a man-
ner as to render the land conveyed or retained inaccessible except
over the land of the grantor or that of a stranger.1 If the easement is
to arise by implication, it must be over the land conveyed or over the
land retained because an easement will not be implied over the land
of a stranger.2 Whether an easement of necessity does arise is pri-
marily a question of intention, which is to be gathered from the instru-
ment and circumstances surrounding its execution. 3 If the grantee
does not have a means of access to his land, a way will be implied
over the grantor s land,4 for it is presumed that the parties did not
intend to convey land without any means of access.5 This implied
intent does not usually accord with tlhe actual or real intent of the
parties because in most instances it is improbable that they thought
of a means of access at the time of the conveyance. Rather the intent
is implied because the conveyance made an easement necessary
Necessity is important because public policy favors utilization of land.0
Before a way of necessity will be implied, it must be a way of
absolute necessity 7 If the grantee s land is bounded on three sides
by the sea, a way of necessity will not be implied over the grantor s
land because navigable waters furnish a means of access even though
it is highly mconvenient s If the grantee has a way over his own
land to the highway but it is impassable part of the year, a way of
necessity will not be implied across the grantor s land.9 The fact that
13 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 284 (3rd ed. 1939).
Hamby v. Stepleton, 221 Ala. 536, 130 So. 76 (1930).
See Orpm v. Mornson, 2430 Mass. 529, - 120 N.E. 183, 184 (1918).
Standard Elkhom Coal Co. v. Moore, 217 Ky. 317, 289 S.W 261 (1926);
Morgan v. Morgan, 205 Ky. 545, 266 S.W 35 (1924); Bentley v. Hampton, 28
Ky. L. Rep. 1083, 91 S.V 266 (1906).
'See Orpm v. Mornson, 230 Mass. 529, -- 120 N. E. 183, 184 (1918).
03 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 285.
' Howton v. Frearson, 8 T. R. 50, 101 Eng. Rep. 1261 (1798).
'Kingsley v. Gouldsboroug Land Imp. Co., 86 Me. 279, 29 Atl. 1074 (1894).
'Marrs v. Ratliff, 278 Ky. 164, 128 S.W 2d 604 (1939).
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a bluff is exceedingly difficult to cross will not be sufficient to create
a way of necessity ' 0 On the other hand, a way of necessity may be
created where the grantee is not landlocked if the cost of construct-
ing a way across his own land is very disproportionate to the value
of the land purchased," or if it is practically impossible to construct
a way i2 These latter cases, which represent a substantial minority
view, do not require an absolute physical necessity but rather an actual,
real, or "reasonable" necessity 13
A quasi-easement exists when a person utilizes one part of his
land for the benefit of another part. The part benefited is called the
quasi-dominant tenement and the part utilized is called the quasi-
servient tenement.' 4 As long as the land remains in the person sub-
jecting it to such use, an easement does not exist because one cannot
have an easement in his own land.15 If the grantor conveys the domi-
nant estate, an easement may be impliedly granted to the grantee
over the grantors servient estate provided the parties so intended.
In order to determine this intent, the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed and the existing condition of the land must
be taken into consideration. 16 If the way across the servient estate
is apparent, continuous, and necessary to the enjoyment of the domi-
nant estate, an easement will be implied, for the parties are presumed
to convey with reference to the existing condition of the land.'7 The
implication giving rise to the intent in an easement based on quasi-
easement is the pre-existing condition of the land. Although this
may not conform to the parties actual intent, it would seem to be
more realistic than the intent implied in an easement of necessity
Since an easement based upon a quasi-easement must be apparent,
continuous, and necessary, it may help to examine briefly these re-
quirements. A way is said to be apparent if its existence was indi-
cated by signs which might be seen or known on a careful inspection
by a person conversant with the subject.' A way will conform to this
standard if it is a well defined road or a path.'0 The grantee need not
have actual knowledge of it since the characteristics of the way serve
to give him constructive notice of the servitude.
As to the continuous character of a way, there is some authority
10 Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick 102 (Mass. 1834).
'Marshall v. Martin, 107 Conn. 32, 139 Atl. 348 (1927).
' Owens v. Goff, 285 Ky. 552, 148 S.W 2d 714 (1941).
" Brassmgton v. Williams, 143 S. C. 223, 141 S.E. 375 (1927).
1 3 TiFrrNY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 255.
' See Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495, 502, 56 S.W 966, 968 (1900).
lrvine v. McGreary, supra note 15.Powers v. Ward, 200 Ky. 478, 255 S.W 105 (1923).
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to the effect that a way is not a continuous servitude and will not
pass as an easement by implication except as a way of necessity 20 The
reason given for this view is that a way requires the interference of
a person for its operation and therefore is not continuous since it is
not constantly exercised. This distinction was taken from the civil
law and the only valid reason for its existence is its greater conspicuity
The view generally followed, however, is not to consider the parti-
cular kind of easement but to consider whether the easement is appar-
ent and designed to be permanent.2 1
An easement is necessary if it is reasonably necessary to the enjoy-
ment of the land conveyed,2 2 or highly convenient,2 3 or clearly neces-
sary to its beneficial use.2 4  In one case, the grantee purchased a lot
which bordered on a street and there was also an alley, leading from
another street, over the grantors land to the rear of the lot. The
grantor closed the alley, but the court held that the grantee had an
implied easement over the alley based on a quasi-easement since it
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the land.25 In another
case, the grantor conveyed a lot which was directly behind three lots
owned by the grantee and these lots bordered on a street. The grantor
had used a way across his own land to reach the lot conveyed, and it
was held that the grantee had an easement over this same road by
implied grant since it was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
the land even though the grantee had a way to the street over his
own land. 0  If a pathway is reasonably necessary to the land con-
veyed, an easement will be implied over the grantors land although
the grantee could have constructed a way out over his own land.2 7
While a way will be implied in favor of the grantee if it is reason-
ably necessary, a way will not be implied in favor of the grantor unless
it is strictly necessary 2s Courts are reluctant to imply a reservation
since it would be inconsistent with the conveyance. The grantor pur-
ports to convey all the land described in the conveyance and if he is
permitted to have an easement across the grantee s land he will be
'Syers v. Dodd, 120 Cal. App. 444, 8 P 2d 157 (1932).
" Hedges v. Stucker, 2.37 Ky. 351, 35 S.W 2d 539 (1931); Powers v. Ward,
200 Ky. 478, 255 S.W 105 (1923).
-" Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W Va. 233, 71 S.E. 198 (1911).
' Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463, 47 N.E. 653 (1897).
-Irvme v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495, 56 S.W 966 (1900).
Fels v. Arends, 328 Ill. 38, 159 N.E. 244 (1927).
"Stevens v. Orr, 69 Me. 323 (1879).
'Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495, 56 S.W 966 (1900).
Powers v. Ward, 200 Ky. 478, 255 S.W 105 (1923).
"Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 S.W 2d 539 (1931).
"Dabney v. Child, 95 Miss. 585, 48 So. 897 (1909); Meredith v. Frank, 56
Oluo St. 479, 47 N.E. 656 (1897).
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derogating from his own grant. Since the degree of necessity required
for a grant and a reservation is different, it must be determined at
the outset whether it is a grant or a reservation. An implied reserva-
tion based on a quasi-easement generally requires the same degree of
necessity as a way of necessity The implied reservation does have
a practical advantage in that the existing roadway will serve as a means
of location while in a way of necessity the way will be located where
it will cause the least damage to the grantee s land. A way based on
a quasi-easement is impliedly reserved where the grantor conveys a
tract of land so as to render the land retained inaccessible except over
the grantee s land. In the case of Meredith v Frank,09 the grantor
owned a tract of land bordering a highway and used a roadway across
the land to reach his house which was a considerable distance from
the highway He conveyed the tract contiguous to the highway, and
the grantee refused to let hun use the roadway The court held that
since the grantor could not reach the highway over his own land, the
grantor had a way corresponding to the pre-existing use over the
grantee s land since it was strictly necessary
However, there is some recent authority that only a reasonable
necessity is required for an implied reservation based on a quasi-
easement.3 0 This view applies the same doctrine to the grantor and
the grantee and is reached by eliminating the distinctions based on
implied reservations and implied grants. This eliminates the need
for making distinctions as to the requisite degrees of necessity since
the result will be the same whether the implication is by grant or
reservation. This view has the advantage of being more simple and
more plausible because the intent in a quasi-easement is implied from
the existing conditions of the land and there is no valid reason why
conditions that will imply a grant should not also imply a reservation.
From the analysis made, it is clear that the two classifications of
implied easement are distinguishable. A quasi-easement must be ap-
parent, continuous, and necessary These elements are not present
in an easement of necessity Both are based on an implication as to
intention stemming from the circumstances existing at the time of
the conveyance, but the implication underlying each is different. In
the quasi-easement the implied intent is that the land was conveyed
subject to the existing servitudes of which the parties are aware. In
the easement of necessity the implication is that the parties intended
' Supra note 28.
Powers v. Ieffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N.E. 661 (1908); Krueger v. Beechan,
61 N.E. 2d 65 (Ind. App., 1945); Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 12 A.
2d (1940).
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to create an easement because the conveyance made one necessary
The most difficult problem is the degree of necessity requisite for
each. Not only is it imperative to determine at the outset whether it
is an easement of necessity or a quasi-easement, but as to the ease-
ment based on a quasi-easement itself, a distinction must be made
between a grant and a reservation. The various consequences of
these distinctions will be illustrated by applying them to a hvpothe-
tical fact situation.
Suppose A owns land which is divided into tract 1 and tract 2
and tract 1 borders a highway A has not established a way across
tract 1 to tract 2, nor is there any outlet from tract 2 to the highway
If A conveys tract 2 to X, X will have a way of necessity over tract 1
to the highway by implied grant. If A conveys tract 1 to X and re-
tains tract 2, A will have a way of necessity over tract 1. The result
is the same since the degree of necessity is the same. But if it be
assumed that there is a well defined roadway across tract 1 to tract 2
and a way over tract 2 to another highway which is impassible part
of the year, a different result is reached for if A conveys tract 1 to X
and retains tract 2, A will not have a way of necessity over tract 1 be-
cause he has a way out over his own land although it is highly mcon-
venient. Nor will A have an easement based on a quasi-easement
over tract 1 because an implied reservation must be strictly necessary
In those jurisdictions which will imply a reservation based on a quasi-
easement if it is reasonably necessary, A would have a way over tract 1.
Further, if A conveys tract 2 to X and retains tract 1, X will not have
a way of necessity over tract 1 because it is not a strict necessity but
X will have a way based on a quasi-easement over tract I since it is
reasonably necessary
In Kentucky, the cases involving easements of necessity are few
in number and whether Kentucky requires an absolute necessity or
something less cannot be determined categorically from the cases.
If the grantor conveys land which is entirely surrounded by land of
the grantor s or that of a stranger, the cases hold that the grantee has
a way of necessity 31 In the cases cited, the court did not say that it
must be an absolute necessity but that is the only implication since
the cases involve landlocked situations. In Hall v McLeod32 the
court, in its dictum, used the phrase "indispensibly necessary" rather
than "absolutely necessary"
It is clear that if a way is apparent, continuous, and reasonably
Morgan v. Morgan, 205 Ky. 545, 266 S.W 35 (1934); Bently v. Hampton,
28 Ky. L. Rep. 1083, 91 S.W 266 (1906).59 Ky. 98, 100 (1859).
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necessary to the enjoyment of the land conveyed, an easement based
on a quasi-easement will pass by implied grant to the grantee. 33 A
reasonable necessity has always been required for an implied grant
based on a quasi-easement m Kentucky While implied grants re-
quire only a reasonable necessity it is not clear what degree of neces-
sity is required to imply a reservation. In Stamper v McNabb,34 the
grantor conveyed a tract of land but reserved a graveyard which was
entirely surrounded by the land conveyed. There was a well-defined
roadway leading from the graveyard to a highway The grantee ob-
structed this way and the grantor sought a reformation of the deed.
The court said there was not any need for reformation since the way
was well defined, continuous, and indispensibly necessary, and thus
the grantor had a way by implied reservation. In Conrad v Smith,35
the grantor owned a tract of land bounded by two highways. The
grantor resided on tract 2 and used a roadway across tract 1 to reach
the highway There was a roadway leading from tract 2 to another
highway which was by no means a good road. He conveyed tract 1
and grantee refused to let him use the way The court refused to
allow the grantor to have a way across tract 1 since an implied re-
servation based on a quasi-easement must be strictly necessary
In the recent case of Knight v Shell,3 the grantor owned a tract
of land bordered by two highways, No. 55 on the east and No. 37 on
the south. There was a roadway leading from No. 55 which the
grantor used as a means of access to some barns located near the
highway The grantor conveyed three-quarters of an acre to Shell
and the roadway passed through this tract. Subsequently, the re-
maming land was conveyed to Knight, and Shell refused to let him
use the roadway Knight constructed a road fifty feet south of the
way m question at a cost of $116. Knight now claims a right to use
the way alleging it is an easement by implication. The court con-
cluded that the way was apparent and continuous but not reasonably
necessary to the enjoyment of Knight's land, for a reasonable neces-
sity does not exist where the cost of construction was not dispropor-
tionate to the value of the land. It was also pointed out that the land
bordering highway No. 55 was level and there were two farm gates
opening on the highway which afforded an easy means of access.
"Delong v. Cline, 302 Ky. 358, 194 S.W 2d 631 (1946); Hutcherson v.
Roland, 247 Ky. 373, 57 S.W 2d 40 (1933); Hedges v. Stucker 237 Ky. 351, :35
S.W 2d 539 (1931); Powers v. Ward, 200 Ky. 478, 255 S.W 105 (1932);
Irvme v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495, 56 S.W 966 (1900).
'172 Ky. 253, 185 S.W 216 (1916).
'203 Ky. 171, 261 S.W 1103 (1924).
313 Ky 852, 233 S.W 2d 973 (1950).
NOTES AND ComrIxENTs
From the language used in this decision it appears that Kentucky
might now require only a reasonable necessity for an implied reserva-
tion of an easement based on a quasi-easement. However, the court
in the opinion did say that "circumstances which may imply an ease-
ment in favor of the grantee may not be sufficient to imply one in
favor of the grantor ,,7 which indicates that a reservation re-
quires a higher degree of necessity than an implied grant. It is a
reasonable conclusion that Kentucky is actually applying the same
doctrine to the grantor and grantee, and at the same time paying
homage to a common law rule of construction that a grant will be
construed more strongly against the grantor than the grantee, since
it is doubtful that an easement would have been implied even in
favor of the grantee on these facts.
While the Kentucky court has not always carefully distinguished
the two kinds of implied easements, they have reached the right re-
sult in most cases. However, this failure to properly classify the type
of easement has lead to considerable confusion since it cannot be
readily ascertained with which type of easement the court is dealing
without a careful analysis of the case.
ERNEsT W RrVERs
EVICTION UNDER A COVENANT OF GENERAL
WARRANTY IN KENTUCKY
A covenant of general warranty is a covenant in a deed conveying
land warranting that the grantee will receive such title as the deed
purports to convey, and in legal effect, it is a covenant that the grantee
and those who claim under him will not be evicted from the land by
someone who has a paramount right or title which was in existence
at the time of conveyance." There is no breach of this covenant
until there has been an eviction under such a paramount right or title.2
An actual eviction is a dispossession or ouster of the covenantee
from the property This may be under compulsion of law or physical
force or, generally, it may be a voluntary moving in the face of an
asserted valid paramount claim.2 A constructive eviction is also
Id. at 855, 233 S.W 2d at 975.
For further confusion on the point, see Swinney v. Haynes, 236 S.W 2d
705 (Ky., 1951).
'4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY sec. 1010, et. seq. (3rd ed. 1939); 172 A.L.R. 20.
4 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sees. 1013 and 1014.
RAiWLE, COVENANTS FOR TrrLE 256 (2nd ed. 1854); 4 TIFFANY, Onl. cit.
supra, note 1, sec. 1013.
